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GOLDSTEIN v. CALIFORNIA-
STATE COPYRIGHT AUTHORITY
OVER SOUND RECORDINGS
On March 22, 1971, Donald Goldstein, Donald Koven, and Ruth Ko-
yen were charged in the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Municipal
District with 140 violations of § 653h of the Penal Code of the State of
California. Their offense was that commonly known as "record piracy"
or "tape piracy:" copying phonograph records or audio tapes and selling
the copies without the consent of the original manufacturer.1 Defendants
entered pleas of nolo contendere on ten counts, reserving a right of ap-
peal. The remaining 130 counts were dismissed.
Defendants appealed their conviction to the Appellate Department of
the Superior Court, which affirmed.2 The California Court of Appeals
denied certiorari. Defendants then petitioned for a writ of certiorari from
the United States Supreme Court, which was granted.
3
At issue in each hearing of the case was the constitutionality of the
law under which defendants were brought to trial. Defendants argued
that the law created a state copyright, and thus violated article I, section
8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution, which gives the federal gov-
ernment the right to grant copyrights and patents.
The Supreme Court affirmed defendants' conviction. 4 In doing so, it
established the right of states to create statutory copyrights over certain
1. The law provides that:
(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:
(1) Knowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be transferred any
sounds recorded on a phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other
article on which sounds are recorded, with intent to sell . . . without the
consent of the owner.
(b) "[Oiwner" means the person who owns the master phonograph record
[or equivalent master recording].
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1970).
Nine other states have similar laws. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1024
(Supp. 1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4617 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. § 543.041
(Supp. July 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:223 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 561 (McKinney 1968); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4244 to 39-4250 (Supp.
1973); TEX. REV. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9012 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-
41.1 to 59.1-41.6 (1973).
2. People v. Goldstein, No. CR.A. 10672 (Super. Ct. Cal., Los Angeles County,
Nov. 12, 1971). The opinion has not been published, but is reproduced in Brief
for Petitioners, Appendix A, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
3. 406 U.S. 956 (1972).
4. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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classes of writings--copyrights broader, in some respects, than those Con-
gress is empowered to create.
The purposes of this note are to review the history of copyright and
copyright-like protection given to phonograph records, audio tapes, and
similar materials (hereinafter classed as "sound recordings"), to analyze
the Supreme Court's decision and reasoning in Goldstein v. California,
and to examine the probable results of that decision.
THE EARLY HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
FOR SOUND RECORDINGS
The sound recording industry began life with no copyright protection
at all. A few cases in the first decade of the twentieth century granted
relief in piracy situations, but they were based on classical theories of
unfair competition,5 and did not clearly grant protection to the sound re-
cordings as such.
In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,6 Apollo was sued
for copyright infringement for selling player piano rolls of White-Smith's
copyrighted music. The trial court found for defendant, and the circuit
court and Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the copyright protection
granted the published writing (the sheet music) could not protect against
sound recordings. The Court maintained that there was an important
distinction between musical scores that could be reproduced by a human
performer, and sound recordings that could be reproduced by a machine.
The former were protectible "writings" within the meaning of the Consti-
tution;7 the latter were
parts of a machine which, when duly applied and properly operated in con-
nection with the mechanism to which they are adapted, produce musical
tones. . . . [W]e cannot think that they are copies within the meaning of
the copyright act.8
Sound recordings were thus viewed as inherently unprotectible.
5. See, e.g., Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Armstrong, 132 F. 711 (S.D.N.Y.
1904). Defendant was enjoined from pirating complainant's records. The ruling
was based in part on the fact that defendant's label was confusingly similar to com-
plainant's, and that defendant was thus engaged in unfair competition. The court
noted that the sound recording itself was pirated, but refused to rule that this was
sufficient grounds for injunction.
6. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Federal power to grant copyright protection
is confined to "writings." The word has been broadly interpreted to include, e.g.,
maps, charts, etchings and prints, sheet music, and photographs. Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973).
8. 209 U.S. at 18.
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White-Smith Music was not strictly a piracy case, since the thing ap-
propriated was the original composition rather than an authorized sound
recording of it. The case is important because of the effect it had on
the Copyright Act of 1909.9 That Act included a special licensing provi-
sion to ensure that the White-Smith Music situation did not recur. Under
its terms, the holder of a musical copyright could decide whether or not
to license his work to a producer of sound recordings. Once he had li-
censed it to one producer, he could not deny it to any other; but he
was entitled to a royalty of two cents per sound recording made by any
party through the term of the copyright. 10
There was no protection against record piracy as such. The accompa-
nying congressional reports made it clear that this omission was inten-
tional." It has been uniformly observed by the courts. 1 2
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF REMEDIES FOR PIRACY
In the absence of statutory protection, the courts proceeded to develop
remedies for sound recording piracy on their own. As the recording in-
dustry matured, such protection proved virtually mandatory; the econom-
ics of the business were such that pirates could easily drive the original
recorders out of business."3
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 4, 1909,
ch. 320, §§ 1 et seq., 35 Stat. 1075).
10. Id. § 1(e).
11. It is not the intention of the committee to extend the right of copyright
to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the composer
or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of
the bill, of the manufacture and use of such devices.
H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909). Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(b)
(1973).
It was early conceded, however, that sound recordings were eligible for federal
copyright protection. Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 567-68 (1973); Capi-
tol Records v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir. 1955).
12. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 567-68 (1973); Capitol Records
v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir. 1955); Jerome v. Twentieth
Century Fox-Film Corp., 67 F. Supp. 737, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 437, 194 A. 631, 633 (1937). Contra, Fon-
otipia Ltd. v. Bradley, 171 F. 951, 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). This case was decided
only five weeks after the 1909 law took effect, and its legislative history evidently
had not been called to the court's attention. As the case arose before the passage
of the new law, the court's remarks must be read as dicta.
13. The expenses of producing a master recording are often in the range of
$50,000 to $100,000. They include salaries for performers and technicians, royalties
for composers, equipment costs, and payments to the musicians' pension fund. Tape
Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 344 (C.D. Cal. 1970). The
pirate avoids these costs; his "overhead" is some relatively cheap copying equip-
ment and one commercial copy of the recording he wishes to pirate. He is also
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The theories courts developed to remedy piracy were varied, but most
of them fitted a common pattern: Plaintiff brought an action in equity,
seeking to enjoin defendant from pirating his sound recordings, and the
court granted relief on a theory of unfair competition or misappropriation.
In its classical form, a showing of misappropriation has three parts:
appropriation, competition, and "passing-off" or misrepresentation. 14  For
example, suppose A markets his product in a distinctive bottle, and builds
up a market of consumers who desire the product and associate the bottle
with it. If B markets a similar product in a similar bottle, with the intent
and result of capitalizing on the associations A's customers have built up,
he is guilty of misappropriation. He has appropriated A's packaging,
he is competing with A, and he is misrepresenting as A's product what
is really his own.
In a typical piracy case, appropriation and competition are present,
but misrepresentation is notably absent. The pirate often flaunts his sta-
tus instead of concealing it. 15 The courts have generally been willing
to excuse the absence of misrepresentation to provide relief. 16
privileged to wait and see which recordings are destined to be "hits" before he in-
curs any expense at all. The original recorder must cover the fixed costs of many
unpopular recordings with his profits from a few popular ones-and these are pre-
cisely the ones on which the pirate competes with him. The $100-million Market
in Bootleg Tapes, Bus. WEEK, May 15, 1971, at 132.
14. Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of the Copyright Interest, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 49, 58 (1969).
15. In Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger, the court quotes from a label
which plaintiffs (including Donald Koven from Goldstein) affixed to the tapes
they sold. It read:
No relationship of any kind exists between [plaintiffs] and the original
recording company nor between this recording and the original recording
artist. This tape is not produced under a license of any kind from the
original company nor the recording artist(s) and neither the original
recording company nor artist(s) receives a fee or royalty of any
kind from [plaintiffs]. Permission to produce this tape has not been
sought nor obtained from any party whatsoever.
316 F. Supp. 340, 343 (C.D. Cal. 1970). See also Note, The Sound Recording Act
of 1971: An End to Piracy on the High @'s?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 964, 971
(1972) [hereinafter cited as End to Piracy].
16. The leading case is Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918). Appellant pirated appellee's news releases as they were posted on appellee's
subscribers' bulletin boards, and printed in early editions of subscribers' papers. The
Court affirmed an injunction against appellant's piracy, holding that appellee,
through its efforts in acquiring and editing news, had acquired a quasi-property right
in it, which piracy violated. "[D]efendant . . . is endeavoring to reap where it
has not sown . . . appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown." Id.
at 239-40. Unfair competition is not limited to misrepresentation of the product,
which occurred here, but is not the essence of the injury either. Id. at 241-42.
The District Court in the Second Circuit later claimed to confine this principle to
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In Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 1 7 plaintiff brought an action
in equity to enjoin defendant from pirating its player piano rolls. The
injunction was granted under a provision of the 1909 Copyright Act pro-
viding that "any party aggrieved" under the terms of the Act might file
a bill for relief in equity.' 8 The court interpreted this to include plain-
tiff, an original recorder whose sound recordings were being pirated.' 9
As the Act protected only copyright proprietors, the court's ruling pro-
tected only such proprietors' licensees; yet the decision was justified in
terms of misappropriation. The pirate "cannot avail himself of the skill
and labor of the original manufacturer . . . but must resort to the copy-
righted composition or sheet music, and not pirate the work of a compet-
itor who has made an original perforated roll."' 20
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.21 illustrates a variation in
the pattern of relief described above. In this case plaintiff sought to
enjoin defendant from broadcasting by radio his musical performances,
which were fixed on phonograph records. The records were sold with
the notice " '[n]ot licensed for radio broadcast.' "22 Plaintiff's petition was
granted, and on appeal -the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. It
held that plaintiff had a common law copyright to his performance, which
gave him a remedy for any unpermitted use. The court went on to con-
sider whether there had been such a "publication" of the performance
as to terminate plaintiff's rights. It concluded that mass distribution of
the facts at bar. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir.
1929); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940); G. Ricordi
& Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952). The ruling proved an exceedingly
elusive prisoner, though, popping out persistently in arguments and opinions on re-
lated topics. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570-71 (1973); Grove Press,
Inc. v.. Collectors Publication, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Fla-
mingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 254 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37, 22 App.
Div. 2d 778, 778-79 (1964); Pottstown Daily News Pub. Co. v. Pottstown Broadcast-
ing Co., 411 Pa. 383, 390-91, 192 A.2d 657, 661-62 (1963); Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 805, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483,
500 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 452,
194 A. 631, 640 (1937).
In a few cases of piracy where the pirate transferred his subject matter from one
medium to another, courts have been willing to dispense with competition as well
as misrepresentation. See text accompanying note 24, infra.
17. 196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
18. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 36, 35 Stat. 1084, as amended 17 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1970).
19. 196 F. at 928.
20. Id. at 927.
21. 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
22. Id. at 443, 194 A.at 636.
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a sound recording did not constitute publication in this sense, and found
for plaintiff.28
In Metropolitan Opera Association v. Wagner - Nichols Recorder
Corp.2 4 Metropolitan Opera had given Columbia Records, Inc. the ex-
clusive right to sell sound recordings of its performances. Wagner-Nichols
sold recordings of these performances which Were "pirated" from radio
broadcasts. Metropolitan Opera sought and obtained an injunction
against this form of piracy, which the court held to be unfair competition.
STATUTORY PROTECTION
In the past two decades, a movement has arisen to protect sound re-
cordings against piracy by statute. In 1948, the municipality of Los An-
geles became the first American governmental authority to pass a piracy
law.2 5  A similar bill was passed by the New York state legislature in
1952, but was vetoed by the Governor.26  New York passed a piracy
law in 1966.27 By 1971 eight states had such laws, 28 and by the time
the briefs for Goldstein were written, ten states had them.2 9
FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION: THE Sears AND COMPCO CASES
By the mid-1960's, the state of the law regarding sound recording
piracy was fairly stable. Original recorders had a remedy in state courts,
which, if less than perfect, was at least workable.80 Then came a pair
23. This contention, while apparently strained, was not without precedent. The
court cited numerous cases in which performances and exhibitions before the general
public, and over radio, had been held not to constitute publication. Id. Contra, RCA
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940). The non-publication, common
law copyright approach seems to have fared less well in federal courts than in state
courts. In Goldstein the whole issue of what constitutes publication was declared
moot; the Court ruled that in federal law the term has meaning only for federally
protectible writings. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 n.28 (1973). See
text accompanying notes 94-96, infra.
24. 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
25. Los Angeles Cal. Municipal Code § 42.19.1 (1948). The statute was re-
pealed in 1970, Los Angeles, Cal. ordinance 140,388, after California's state piracy
law was passed.
26. Note, Piracy On Records, 5 STAN. L. REV. 433, 440 (1953).
27. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 441c (McKinney 1967), as amended N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 561 (McKinney 1968).
28. See End to Privacy, supra note 15, at 969.
29. See collection of statutory material, supra note 1.
30. On the shortcomings of state protection, see End to Piracy, supra note 15,
at 975.
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of Supreme Court decisions which, while not concerned directly with
sound recordings, threatened to overturn the whole structure.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,81 Sears marketed a "pole lamp"
substantially similar to one invented, patented and sold by Stiffel. Stiffel
sued Sears for patent infringement and unfair competition. The district
court held the patent invalid for lack of originality, but found Sears guilty
of unfair competition under an Illinois law which forbade copying anoth-
er's product with the intent of palming it off as the product of the other.
The district court found no actual intent on the part of Sears, but held
that the similarity of the two products had the result of causing customers
to think Sears' product was made by Stiffel.A2
In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,88 Compco made a fluor-
escent lighting fixture substantially similar to one invented, patented and
sold by Day-Brite. Day-Brite sued Compco for patent infringement and
unfair competition. The district court held the patent invalid for lack
of originality, but held Compco guilty of unfair competition under the
same law used in Sears. The finding regarding Compco's "intent" to mis-
represent its product as Day-Brite's were similar to the finding in Sears . 4
The Supreme Court reversed Sears and Compco in consecutive deci-
sions. Its arguments and conclusions were the same in both cases, the
opinion in Compco being essentially a summary of the opinion in Sears.
In Sears, the Court began with a consideration of the purpose of the
copyright clause in the Constitution. It was "'[tjo promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries.'-35 To this end, the patent and copyright provision of the Con-
stitution was enacted to provide the incentive provision of the Constitution
was enacted to provide the incentive of a limited monopoly to prospec-
tive writers and inventors. It provided a limited monopoly only, for the
founding fathers were well aware of the dangers inherent in monopolies
of any sort, and the ease with which they could be abused.
The limits on copyright and patent monopolies were of several sorts.
First, the Constitution itself required that these monopolies be granted
only "for limited Times." In addition, Congress had the authority to
say what might and might not be given protection, so that "'the heavy
31. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
32. Id. at 226.
33. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
34. Id. at 235.
35. 376 U.S. at 228 quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
1974]
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hand of tribute [might not] be laid on each slight technological advance
in an art.' "86
Thus, the acts of Congress which established the limits of copyright
and patent protection were viewed as establishing a balance between the
benefits of this special sort of monopoly, and the destructive effects on
commerce of monopoly per se. As a necessary result, the failure of Con-
gress to protect a certain class of protectible work was viewed as a posi-
tive measure, not a neutral one. The federal courts or the states could
not protect such a work, claiming that by failing to act, Congress had
abandoned that class of work to judicial or state legislative control. To
do so would be to upset the balance between the good and bad effects
of monopoly, arrived at by Congress through the process of protecting
some kinds of works and not others. In the words of the Court:
[T]he patent system is one in which uniform federal standards are care-
fully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free
competition. Obviously a State could not . . .extend the life of a patent
...or give a patent on an article which lacked the level of invention
required for federal patents. To do either would run counter to the policy
of Congress of granting patents only to true inventions, and then only for
a limited time.87
The Court went on to rule that the unfair competition law used in Sears
was unconstitutional, because its effect was to give the equivalent of
patent protection to an article which failed to meet federal standards for
patentability. It thus upset the balance of protection established by Con-
gress, and conflicted with the policies expressed by federal law. The
Court thought it unnecessary to consider whether or not the law was oth-
erwise a valid exercise of state police power.
In Compco the Court retraced most of the reasoning of Sears, and
reached the same result: "[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent
or copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article. ' 38
If read literally, Sears and Compco appeared to spell the end of protec-
tion against sound recording piracy by any authority except Congress.
Both cases dealt with patent protection, but nothing in either opinion indi-
cated a distinction between patent and copyright. Compco, in the passage
quoted above, indicated explicitly that the two were to be treated as equiv-
alent.
36. Id. at 230 quoting Cuno-Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S.
84, 92 (1941).
37. Id. at 230-31.
38. 376 U.S. at 237.
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THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO Sears AND Compco
A swift judicial reponse to Sears and Compco was necessary, for some
piracy cases were moving through the courts even as the decisions were
being handed down. In one such case, Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited,3 9 CBS obtained an injunction against
record piracy by Documentaries Unlimited on the theory of a radio an-
nouncer's quasi-property right in his performance, similar to the right as-
serted in International News Service v. Associated Press.40 The case was
decided three days before Sears and Compco, but after those decisions
came out, Documentaries Unlimited requested reargument, and Judge
Geller wrote a postscript to his opinion denying the request. He gave
three reasons for doing so. First, he claimed that in the case at bar
misrepresentation had occurred, and that Sears and Compco prohibited
interference with piracy only in cases where misrepresentation, if any,
was only constructive. This reason is unconvincing for two reasons: first,
nothing in Judge Geller's initial opinion indicated misrepresentation, and
second, Compco contradicted it.41
Judge Geller's second reason was that the pirated work was held to
be "unpublished, '42 and thus exempt from the operation of the Copyright
Act.43 His third reason was the Documentaries Unlimited had not mere-
ly "copied" CBS's broadcast, but had "appropriated" it in a more funda-
mental, piratical way, which Sears and Compco did not protect. 44
The distinction between "copying" and "appropriation" is rather
wispy, and one may well doubt whether it has any content. The essence
of the distinction is that "copying" refers to an object, such as the "parts
of a machine" denied protection in White-Smith Music, or the pole lamp
denied protection in Sears. "Appropriation," on the other hand, refers
to the information contained on a sound recording, in which the recorder
retains a "quasi-property right," as the appellee retained a quasi-property
39. 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
40. See note 16, supra.
41. IT]hat there may be 'confusion' among purchasers as to which article
is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying
a State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and regard-
less of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can furnish
a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying
and selling.
376 U.S. at 238.
42. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42
Misc. 2d 723, 725, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809 , 811 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
43. Id. at 726-27, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
44. Id. at 727, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
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right in the information contained in his news dispatches in Internation-
al News Service. Since an invention does not bear "information" in the
sense that a writing does, the appropriation-versus-copying distinction re-
solves into a copyright-versus-patent distinction, and affords a basis for
excepting sound recording piracy remedies from the implications of Sears
and Compco. On analysis, however, the distinction proves hard to pin
down. The Supreme Court has ruled that ideas, concepts, and natural
phenomena, as distinct from inventions embodying them, are unpatent-
able.45  Is not the information embodied in a sound recording analogous
to the idea, concept, or natural phenomenon embodied in an invention?
If so, how can it be allowed protection? Perhaps the only virtue of the
copying-versus-appropriation distinction is that it allows the courts to es-
cape the disruptive effects that a straightforward application of Sears and
Compco would have on an important industry.46
Be that as it may, the copying-Versus-appropriation distinction was the
one chosen by subsequent courts wishing to provide relief against piracy
of sound recordings and other unpatentable writings. In Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc.,47 a New York court granted an injunction
against record piracy, and stated that Sears and Compco did not deprive
plaintiff of protection:
Neither of those learned decisions stands for the proposition that this
plaintiff is not entitled to protection against the unauthorized appropriation
... of the actual performances contained in its records. 48
In Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publication, Inc.,49 Collectors Publi-
cation prepared to publish a book by photocopying Grove Press's edition,
a procedure equivalent to sound recording piracy. A federal district court
found the Grove Press edition to be uncopyrightable, the manuscript
having been in the public domain, but nevertheless enjoined Collectors
Publication from publishing its photocopied edition:
Unfair appropriation of the property of a competitor is unfair compe-
tition and redressable in a situation of this kind despite the holdings in
[Sears and Compco]....
45. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); MacKay Radio & Telegraph
Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v.
Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1974).
46. See generally End to Piracy, supra note 15, at 974.
47. 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
48. Id. at 881, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
49. 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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Defendants' first edition is more than mere copying of Plaintiffs work
• . . it would constitute unfair competition for Defendants to appropriate
[it].50
In Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp.,51 United Art-
ists pirated an uncopyrighted film licensed to Flamingo Telefilm Sales
for its exclusive use. The court enjoined United Artists from using the
film on the grounds that it had misappropriated a common law property
right licensed to Flamingo Telefilm Sales by the film's owner. The court
ruled that Sears and Compco did not apply.52
In Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson,53 Capitol Records sought to en-
join piracy by Erickson. The trial court granted the injunction, and the
court of appeals affirmed. Using language modelled after International
News Service, the opinion contended that Sears and Compco did not
apply where defendant "unfairly appropriates to his profit the valuable
efforts of his competitor," 54 in this case the effort and expense involved
in cutting an original record.
A few cases have held to the contrary. In Cable Vision, Inc.
v. KUTV, Inc.,5 5 KUTV was denied an injunction against Cable Vision,
which had "pirated" its television broadcasts and redistributed them via
cable television. The court held that Sears and Compco determined its
decision for defendant: plaintiff's broadcasts, as such, being uncopyright-
ed, were free to be copied (or appropriated).56  The court also chose
to adopt the classical definition of unfair competition, thus denying re-
covery in the absence of "palming off," and dismissed International News
Service as limited to the facts there at bar.5 7  Its decision was thus close
to what a literal interpretation of Sears and Compco could produce.58
In State's Attorney v. Sekuler,5 9 defendant was accused of violating
50. Id. at 606-07.
51. 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 22 App.
Div. 2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1964).
52. Id. at 462.
53. 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969).
54. Id. at 538, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
55. 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
56. Id. at 351.
58. Id. at 352.
58. Accord, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
(1968). These cases might better be taken as rulings on the rights of cable televi-
sion operators than on the extent of the Sears and Compco doctrine. Cable Vision
v. KUTV was distinguished in a case upholding state protection against sound -re-
cording piracy. Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
59. 249 Md. 499, 240 A.2d 608 (1968).
1974]
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
a state law which prohibited reproduction for sale of certain tax maps
published by the state. On appeal, the state supreme court reversed,
holding that Sears and Compco rendered the state law invalid.!0 Taking
note of the many aforementioned cases which "seem not to follow Sears
and Compco,"' a the court held that the case at bar was distinguishable.
It did not involve a law prohibiting misappropriation (which the court
viewed as implying palming-off), but merely one "creating a monopoly
for the State."' 62 There was no reason given for ruling that defendant's
act was less of a misappropriation than that prohibited in Grove Press,
and no contention was made that Sears and Compco allowed judicial pro-
tection against piracy, but not statutory protection. The only remaining
distinction between this case and earlier cases where protection was al-
lowed was that in this case protection was claimed for the state, and
previous cases it was claimed for private persons and corporations. That
distinction could be valid, but it was not directly mentioned in the
opinion, and was not even hinted at in the Sears and Compco opinions.
It appears that the majority of courts have refused to follow up on
the implications of Sears and Compco with regard to sound recordings
-and related works. Instead, they devised the distinction between "copy-
ing" and "appropriation," which enabled them to avoid applying Sears
and Compco to piracy cases, and to continue supplying a form of relief
that had initially been devised because it was so important to the health
of a major industry.
DEVELOPMENTS LEADING UP TO Goldstein
The stage was set for Goldstein v. California by four legal events:
the passage of two statutes, and the trial of 2 cases.
The first event was the passage of California's sound recording piracy
law, making it a misdemeanor to copy sound recordings for sale without
the consent of the owner of the master recording.63  This occurred in
1968.
The second event was the decision in Tape Industries Association of
America v. Younger. 4 In this case the Tape Industries Association, an
organization of tape pirates, sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against enforcement of the California law by the Los Angeles district at-
torney. Plaintiff claimed that the rulings in Sears and Compco, and Ca-
60. Id. at 501, 240 A.2d at 610.
61. Id. at 505, 240 A.2d at 612.
62. Id.
63. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 653h (West 1970).
64. 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1971),
appeal docketed, No. 26, 628, 9th Cir. 1973.
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ble Vision rendered the law an unconstitutional infringement of the fed-
eral copyright authority. The court denied plaintiff relief, relying on the
distinction between copying and appropriation to show that Sears and
Compco did not apply.65  It distinguished Cable Vision on the ground
that in that case defendants "were not enjoined because they simply re-
broadcast a television transmission that was normally received without
charge." 66 In conclusion, the court asserted
that [the California law] is a tolerable and permissible state regulation
...and does not unconstitutionally intrude on the Federal policies enun-
ciated in the Copyright Clause .... 67
The third event was the passage of the Federal Sound Recording Act
in 1971, extending copyright protection to sound recordings. 68 The rele-
vant portions of the Act gave copyrighted sound recordings the same pro-
tection against unauthorized reproduction that was traditionally granted
other kinds of works, and set up procedures for giving notice of and
registering sound recording copyrights. These portions of the Act were
to take effect four months from the date of passage, and were to continue
in effect until December 31, 1974.69 As the acts complained of in Gold-
stein occurred before the Act took effect, the Act did not affect the out-
come of the case in any direct way. 70
The fourth event was Tape Head Co. v. RCA Corp.,71 in which a
group of tape pirates tested the Sound Recording Act to see if it would
invalidate state piracy law retroactively, and found that it would not.
Tape Head sought injunctive relief against RCA, which it claimed was
65. Id. at 350.
66. Id. In other words, plaintiff's broadcasts could not be protected because
they comprised publications which dedicated the works therein to the public. The
same rationale could equally well be used to deny protection to a radio broadcaster
whose words are recorded and sold in sound recordings; yet this was the situation
in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Documentaries Unlimited, 42 Misc. 2d 723, 248
N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964), the first case to allow protection notwithstanding
Sears and Compco. See text accompanying notes 39 to 44, supra.
67. 316 F. Supp. at 351.
68. 17 U.S.C. §§ I(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26, 101(e) (Supp. 1I, 1972).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 1 note (Supp. II, 1972) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15,
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391). The termination date was inserted
not with any expectation that the law would be allowed to lapse, but with the expec-
tation that it would be revised in the light of experience gained during its opera-
tions. See Int'l Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 E. Supp. 38, 42 n.3 (S.D. Fla.
1972); End to Piracy, supra note 15, at 994.
70. The Act provides protection only to recordings "fixed" (recorded) and pub-
lished after February 15, 1972. Thus a recording published and/or fixed before
that date could not be copyrighted, and could not be protected even after the Act
took effect. Id.
71. 452 F.2d 816 (l0th Cir. 1971).
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planning to bring actions in state courts to enjoin Tape Head's piracy.
Plaintiffs' main contention was that in passing the Sound Recording Act,
and giving federal protection to sound recordings fixed after February 15,
1972, Congress manifested an intention that recordings fixed before that
date should be left unprotected, pre-empting the entire sound recording
field and terminating any state power to provide relief. 72  The court re-
jected this contention, citing the words of the Act itself:
mhe Act . . . should not be applied retroactively or "be construed as
affecting in any way rights with respect to sound recordings fixed before
the effective date of this Act." 73
The court stopped short of ruling on the validity of plaintiffs' claim, but
plainly considered it without merit, and refused plaintiffs the "extraordinary
abortive relief" which they requested. 74
ARGUMENTS AND DECISION IN Goldstein
The issues Iesolved in Goldstein may be divided into five groups: the
effect of the Constitution on state copyright power; the effect on congres-
sional action on state copyright power; the interpretation of Sears and
Compco; the application of the "limited times" provision of the federal
copyright mandate 7 5 to state copyright power; and the effect of "publica-
tion" on the status of protectible writings.
Although neither litigant pressed the point, the Court felt obliged first
to consider whether or not the constitutional grant of copyright power
to Congress pre-empted all state power in that area.7 6  The Court con-
cluded that it did not, citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens: A power grant-
ed to Congress by the Constitution may be inferred to be pre-emptive
only if its nature is such that it can be wielded effectively by only one
authority at a time. Further, a power granted to Congress as a unit may
72. id. at 819.
73. Id. quoting in part 17 U.S.C. § 1, note (Supp. II, 1972).
74. 452 F.2d at 820. Contra, Int'l Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp.
38 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief against pros-
ecution under a Florida statute similar to California's tape piracy law. The court
granted relief, holding that the state law infringed the federal copyright authority.
In its opinion the court relied heavily on Sears and Compco, id. at 49-51, and re-
jected the conclusions of other federal courts in Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v.
Younger, id. at 51, and Tape Head Co. v. RCA Corp., id. at 52. This case was
not discussed in the Supreme Court's Goldstein opinion.
75. The Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
76. 412 U.S. at 552-58.
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be pre-emptive in part and non-pre-emptive in part, depending on the
nature of each part. 77
The Court's reasoning in bringing the copyright power within this rule
was that not all writings are of national importance, and hence not all
writings warrant federal copyright protection. Those which are of impor-
,tance within only one state may be given protection by the laws of that
state without invasion of the federal copyright interest. 78
This local-importance argument may have been suggested by analogy
,to Cooley, where the Court upheld local laws regulating marine pilots,
despite the fact that the pilots were involved in interstate commerce. The
Court ruled that by its nature pilotage was an aspect of interstate com-
merce appropriate to local control, and so made an exception to the es-
tablished rule that interstate commerce is under exclusive federal control.
In the context of Goldstein, however, the line of reasoning is incongruous.
It defines the domain of state copyright power by subject matter. At
issue in Goldstein is the domain of state copyright power as defined by
medium. Even if the words of the Court are ignored, 79 and the argu-
ment is applied to media, it makes little sense. How may a medium,
such as phonography, be said to have importance only within one state?
The local-importance argument is not necessary to the Court's conclu-
sion; indeed, much firmer refutation of the claim to constitutional pre-
emption is found in the fact that the states have traditionally conferred
common law copyright on certain classes of writings not protected by Con-
gress-those which are unpublished-and their right to do so is firmly
established in American law.8 0
It seems likely that the local-importance argument is intended to refute
appellants' claim that, even if the federal copyright mandate is not pre-
emptive as defined by the Constitution, a congressional policy of national
uniformity in copyright protection requires that it be treated as pre-emp-
tive.81 The Court does not, however, make this connection explicitly.
77. Id. at 553-54, quoting 53 U.S. 229, 319 (1851).
78. Id. at 556-58.
79. [I]t is unlikely that all citizens in all parts of the country place the
same importance on works relating to all subjects .... IT]he subject matter
to which the Copyright Clause is addressed may thus be of purely local im-
portance and not worthy of national attention or protection.
Id. at 557-58 (emphasis added).
80. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 2; Wheaton v. Peters, 33' U.S. 591, 657
(1834); Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. 608, 614 (1871); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 439, 194 A. 631, 634 (1937); Brief of Respondent at
33-34, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
81. Brief for Petitioners at 11-12, Brief of Respondent at 33-37, Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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Appellants attempted to prove congressional pre-emption of the sound
recording field in particular, as well as the copyright field in general.
The claim that Congress actively intended recordings made prior to the
Sound Recording Act of 1972 to have no protection was deprived of most
of its force by the lower court decision in Tape Head.8 2  Appellants fol-
lowed an alternative line of argument: Congress occupied the area of
sound recording protection, and indicated that sound recordings should
have no protection at all, by repeatedly considering laws -that would pro-
tect such recordings, and rejecting them.8 3 To this, appellee countered
that the failure of Congress to pass proposed legislation must be treated
as a neutral act. From the defeat of policy A one cannot infer an en-
dorsement of policy B, its opposite, when many intermediate policies are
also possible.8 4  In any case, the true reason for the failure of earlier
protective measures was not a desire to leave sound recordings unpro-
tected, but the inability of those who desired protection to agree on a
means of implementing it.s5
The Court accepted appellee's arguments on this point, ruling that the
congressional failure to protect sound recordings was neutral, even where
it took the form of active rejection of protective legislation:
At any time Congress determines that a particular category of "writing"
is worthy of national protection . . . . [it] may be authorized. Where
the need for free and unrestricted distribution of a writing is thought to
be required by the national interest, the Copyright Clause and the Com-
merce Clause would allow Congress to eschew [that is, prohibit] all pro-
tection. . . . However, where Congress determines that neither federal
protection nor freedom from restraint is required by the national interest,
it is at liberty to stay its hand entirely.8 6
With this, the Court appears to have discarded the pre-emption theory
entirely. At first glance, Goldstein flatly contradicts Sears and Compco,
which established that theory. It is true that both of those cases dealt
with patent protection, and the extension to copyright suggested in the
Compco opinion may be treated as dicta, but one must establish some
justification for limiting Sears and Compco in this way, when their rea-
soning appears to apply to patent and copyright protection with equal
force.
82. 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971).
83. Brief for Petitioners at 10, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
84. Application of Respondent for Leave to File Post-argument Memorandum
& Post-argument Memorandum at 10, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
85. Brief for Respondent at 28-29, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
86. 412 U.S. at 559.
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Appellants relied heavily on Sears and Compco in their argument,
claiming that those cases applied equally to patents and copyrights, and
thus invalidated the state law under which appellants were being prose-
cuted. s7 Appellee sought to distinguish sound recording piracy from the
physical-design piracy that occurred in Sears and Compco on the basis
of the copying-versus-appropriation distinction developed in piracy cases
decided after Sears and CoMpco.8 8
The Court agreed with appellee that Sears and Compco did not ap-
ply, but used different reasoning. The Court wrote that in the patent
area,
Congress had balanced the need to encourage innovation and originality
of invention against the need to insure competition in the sale of identical
or substantially identical products. The standards established for granting
federal patent protection to machines thus indicated not only which articles
in this particular category Congress wished to protect, but which config-
urations it wished to remain free. . . . No comparable conflict between
state law and federal law arises in the case of recordings of musical per-
formances. In regard to this category of "writings," Congress has drawn
no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended, and no reason exists
why the State should not be free to act.8 9
This begs the question. Why had Congress drawn a balance between
the incentives and dangers of monopoly in the patent area, but not the
copyright area? The answer does not appear in the Court's opinion. It
may lie in a basic distinction between inventions and writings. The lat-
ter are susceptible to classification into many different media, with differ-
ent technical and policy considerations for each, while the former are
not.90 Thus, by failing to regulate certain media, Congress may abandon
them to the states' supervision; but by regulating patents, Congress pre-
empts the entire field.
Appellants argued that the California statute was unconstitutional in
that it granted protection for an unlimited time, while the Constitution
gives Congress the power to grant copyright protection only for limited
87. Brief for Petitioners at 11-15, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
88. Brief for Respondent at 39-41, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
89. 412 U.S. at 569-70.
90. This distinction, although appealing, may have a limited life expectancy.
Technology is now threatening the concept of an "invention" with the same sort
of fluidity it has imposed on the concept of a "writing" since the turn of the cen-
tury. For example, are computer programs patentable inventions? Despite a few
court rulings, the issue is far from settled. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972); Duggan, Patents on Programs? The Supreme Court Says No, 16 CoM-
MUNICATIONS OF THE AS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY 60 (1973); Titus, Supreme
Court Ruling Fails to Settle Issue of Patenting Computer Programs, id. at 63.
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times. 91 Appellee rejected this contention, claiming that it did not limit
the concurrent power of the states.9 2  The Court accepted appellee's view,
holding that:
Section 8 enumerates those powers which have been granted to Congress;
whatever limitations have been appended to such powers can only be un-
derstood as a limit on congressional, and not state, action. 93
This holding yields the anomalous result that the states have power over
federally "unprotected" media by the default of Congress, yet the states
can do what Congress cannot do, i.e., grant protection for unlimited times.
Finally, appellants claimed that the records they pirated were "pub-
lished," and thus in the public domain; appellee countered with numer-
ous precedents indicating that distribution of a sound recording did not
constitute publication.9 4 The Court dismissed this issue completely, say-
ing only that for the purposes of federal law, "publication" was a tech-
nical term with meaning only for those media which Congress chose to
protect. 95 This holding is not to the point, since the question of pub-
lication determines the availability of common law copyright-a doctrine
of state law, not federal law. The Court may have been motivated to
evade this issue to avoid clashing with the prevailing federal rule, which
would work in favor of appellants.9 6
The case produced two dissenting opinions. One was written by Mr.
Justice Douglas, the other Mr. Justice Marshall, with Mr. Justice Bren-
nan and Mr. Justice Blackmun joining in each. The contents of these
opinions were similar: each saw no distinction between patents and copy-
rights which would justify excepting Goldstein from the federal pre-emp-
tion rule set out in Sears and Compco. The idea that Congress struck
a balance between the benefits and drawbacks of the patent monopoly,
they said, applied equally well to copyrights. In addition, Mr. Justice
Douglas noted that the policy of uniformity of protection, which dictates
federal pre-emption, applied equally well to each.
CONCLUSION
In Goldstein, the Court chose to limit the federal pre-emption doctrine
set out in Sears and Compco. That doctrine, which previously appeared
91. Brief of Petitioners at 13.
92. Respondent's Post-argument Memorandum at 7.
93. 412 U.S. at 560 (emphasis by the Court).
94. Brief of Petitioners at 15-22, Brief of Respondent at 44-46.
95. 412 U.S. at 570 n.28.
96. See note 23, supra.
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to forbid state law to grant protection in the nature of patent or copyright,
now forbids protection in the nature of patent only.
While Goldstein appears to contradict the wording and reasoning of
Sears and Compco to this extent, it is in accord with a great number
of state and lower federal court decisions, made both before and after
Sears and Compco, which recognize the power of the states to protect
sound recordings from piracy. In part, it may have been dictated by
the same economic policy considerations that caused the courts to develop
a remedy for piracy in the first place, and which obliged them to main-
tain it in the face of Sears and Compco.
Far from being mooted by the Sound Recording Act of 1971, the rem-
edy for sound recording piracy in state law promises to remain a produc-
tive legal theory for many years. The Sound Recording Act gives no
protection to sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972; the state
law remedy remains the only protection for such recordings.
The state law remedy may also be extended to cover new media as
circumstances warrant. The acceleration of technology which began in
the ninteenth century has not yet ceased, and it is a fair bet that federal
copyright law will have at least as much trouble keeping up with the
times in the future as it has had in the past. It is usually difficult for
legislators to agree quickly on the need for novel copyright protection-
and it is not always desirable for them to agree too soon, as they may
well freeze a remedy prematurely into some misconceived form.97 While
Congressmen debate, and while the general concept of a new form of
protection matures, the piracy remedy in state law can provide a valuable
stopgap.
Jonathan Sachs
97. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 11, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 719,
737 (1945).
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